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RECENT CASES
ADOPTION-Foreign adoption repugnant to Virginia public policy with no treaty right violated. Doulgeris v. Bambacus, Administrator,203 Va. 670, 127 S.E. 2d 145 (1962).
At the age of fourteen, -the appellant was adopted under
Greek law by an elderly couple. They were in poor health
and in need of someone to care for them. The adoption was
simply an arrangment for the convenience of the adoptive
parents, but it was in keeping with the public policy of Greece.
It was consented to by the natural father of the appellant,
but without regard to its effect upon her interest and welfare.
The appellant offered no evidence to show that she had ever
lived with her adoptive parents or had ever recognized them
as such.
The appellant wished to inherit from the son of her adoptive parents, and she claimed that she was his adopted sister
under Greek law. She urged that Virginia recognize the Greek
adoption because of the treaty between the United States
and the Kingdom of Greece which guaranteed to Greek
nationals treatment no less favorable than that accorded in
like situations to nationals of any third country.
Under the local law of Virginia the primary consideration
in an adoption proceeding is the welfare and best interest
of the child. Both the adopting and the natural parents must
consent to the adoption unless consent is unobtainable or
withheld to the detriment of the child in the opinion of the
court. Va. Code Ann. 1950 § 63-351 (Cum. Supp. 1960); Harmon v. D'adamo, 195 Va. 125, 77 S.E. 2d 318 (1953); Newton
v. Wilson, 201 Va. 1, 109 S.E. 2d 105 (1959). If the child is
fourteen years of age, he must also give his consent. An investigation is made of the adopting parents to see if they
are financially able to care for the child. Thus, the fundamentals of the Greek adoption procedure conflict with Virginia's public policy of adoption, and in Virginia the essential
requirements of Virginia law must be met. Without noting
any distinction between the concept of public policy in the
internal law of Virginia and the concept of public policy in
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conflict of laws, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that foreign law or rights based thereon will not be given
effect or enforced if contrary to the settled public policy of
the forum. Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va.
425, 4 S.E. 2d 364 (1939).
The Virginia court violated no treaty right by refusing to
recognize the Greek adoption. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 364 U. S.
812, 81 S. Ct. 44 (1961), demonstrates the treaty's guarantee
that nationals of the most favored nation are entitled to inherit on the same basis as American next of kin, but Todok v.
Union States Bank, 281 U. S. 44:9, 50 S. Ct. 363 (1930) points
out that such treaties are not construed as placing aliens on
a better footing than United States citizens.
Although the appellant's adoption was proper in the Kingdom of Greece, it was repugnant to the public policy of
Virginia which is for the protection of the best interest of
the child, and it could not be recognized. The treaty upon
which the appellant relied gave her no preferred rights.
JAm-S D. DAvis

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ... Recidivist convictions: Failure to apply recidivist statute to persons convicted out-ofstate not a denial of equal protection of the law. Sims v.
CunMingham, 203 Va. 347, 124 S.E. 2d 221, cert. denied, 83
S. Ct. 68 (1962).
The petitioner, thrice sentenced to the penitentiary for
violation of Virginia penal laws, was sentenced to an additional ten years under the Virginia recidivist statute. This
statute, Va. Code Ann. § 53-296 (1950), provides ... if it
shall come to the knowledge of the Director of the Department
of Welfare and Institutions . . ." that a prisoner has been
previously sentenced two or more times for a like punishment
in the United States, and such information is confirmed by
a finding of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, the
prisoner may be sentenced to such additional time as the
court deems proper.
"
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The petitioner, having been convicted only in Virginia,
contended that the administrative application of the statute
denied him equal protection of the law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. His contention was founded upon the consistent and long continued
practice by Virginia officials of failing to apply the recidivist
provision to persons who had been convicted of committing
previous crimes in states other than Virginia. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, sustaining the conviction, held
that there had been no constitutional violation.
The decision disposed of the second major attack on the
constitutionality of Virginia's administration of the statute.
In Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U. S. 443, 82 S. Ct. 498
(1962), the first such attack, the Supreme Court of the United
States held the "potential prejudice" inherent in a recidivist
trial to be so great that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the accused have the
assistance of counsel. This holding necessitated an abrupt
change in Virginia procedure and immediately resulted in
new trials for approximately sixteen hundred convicts. In
view of these ramifications it is important to realize -the effect
of the Equal Protection Clause in recidivist cases and to appreciate the true basis of the principal case.
In Sims v. Cunningham, supra, the Virginia court, holding
that there was no denial of equal protection, apparently rested
this conclusion on three grounds. First, equal protection of
the law ". ..cannot be used to demand protection ... in the
commission of a crime"; second, the failure to proceed
against out-of-state repeaters could result ". . . from mere
laxity in the administration of the law" rather than being an
intentional act of discrimination; and third, failure to enforce
the statute against foreign repeaters resulted from the Director of Welfare and Institutions not having the requisite
"knowledge" of the out-of-state convictions.
The first and second grounds are not wholly satisfying. In
holding that Sims could not use the Constitution to "demand
protection.., in the commission of a crime" the court equated
the petitioner's claim of discriminatory treatment with that
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of a murderer claiming denial of equal protection on the
ground that others have murdered with impunity. In Goodman v. Kunkle, 72 F. 2d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 619, 55 S. Ct. 218, it was held that habitual criminality
is not a crime but a state of being. See also Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624, 627, 32 S. Ct. 583 (1934). Thus,
it would seem clear that the petitioner was not trying to invoke the Constitution to aid in the furtherance of a crime.
The petitioner specifically urged that the administrative policy arbitrarily created two classes, Virginia repeaters and
foreign repeaters, and that he, as a member of the former
class, was a subject of discrimination. A concurring justice
felt this argument to be immaterial because the petitioner
was in no way harmed by this practice. Although it is not
specifically spelled out, these observations intimate that the
petitioner had no standing to challenge this practice.
The famous case of Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541,
62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) refutes the foregoing observations by
distinguishing the Virginia court's "murder analogy" and
rendering impotent the suggestion of "no harm to the petitioner". In Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, the United States
Supreme Court ended the discriminatory practice under the
habitual criminal statute of sterilizing offenders guilty of
larceny while excluding those guilty of embezzlement. The
court stated "[w]hen -he law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense
S.. it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." (Emphasis added.) In view of this statement it would
seem that the Virginia court failed to face the issue of class
discrimination.
The second ground is also somewhat unstable. In support
of the petitioner's contention that the Virginia policy was
intentional discrimination rather than inadvertence, it was
established that the present procedure has prevailed for over
one hundred years. The court concluded "[i] t may be mere
laxity in the administration by the department, but mere
laxity, no matter how long continued, is not.., a denial of
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equal protection of the law." This sustained policy has
prompted the observation -that"[a]t least such action would
appear to be a planned laxity." Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 Va. L. Rev. 597, 621 (1962).
The third ground for the decision held that the Director
did not have thje requisite statutory "knowledge". This
ground makes the case rest on a firmer basis. In order to
secure a conviction under the recidivist statute, it is necessary
that the convicting court have before it authenticated records
of the out-of-state convictions. The Director does not have
and has never had in his possession any such records. His
information consists solely of reports of out-of-state convictions forwarded to him by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Virginia court implied that the "knowledge" contemplated by the statute was documented information, at
least more than "hearsay and rumors" which are not susceptible to use as evidence.
In essence then, the petitioner's argument resolves into a
question of whether a failure of the Director to take steps to
procure authenticated records of out-of-state convictions,
after having knowledge of their probable existence, is a denial
of equal protection of the law. The real question is whether
such a failure is unreasonable discrimination.
The statute placed no affirmative duty on the Director to
obtain "knowledge" of the foreign convictions, and to obtain
the information invisioned by the statute would have involved
a tedious and expensive operation of collecting authenticated
records of out-of-state convictions. Furthermore, costly positive action here would not have aided the petitioner in effectuating his right to challenge, as was the situation in the now
famous case of Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585
(1956). In -light of these circumstances, the practice does not
appear unreasonable. Therefore, there is no constitutionally
prohibited discrimination.
ROBERT W. MANN
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EVIDENCE--Litigant's testimony must be read as a whole.
Virginia Electric & Power Company v. Mabin, 203 Va. 490,
125 S.E. 2d 145 (1962).
In 1922 the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals laid down
the rule in Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652,
that a party is bound by his own testimony once he has
given it on direct examination. The litigant's cause of action
may not rise above his own statements.
The case of Massie v. Firmstone, supra, seems to stand
for two basic propositions. First, if a litigant testifies to
some fact that would preclude his recovery he is irrevocably
bound by that testimony. Second, once the party has so
testified he will not be permitted to contradict or correct his
previous statements. The litigant is bound by his previous
admissions despite the fact that such testimony may have
been given under the stress of extensive cross examination.
A party is bound by statements requiring expert knowledge
even though the litigant is unqualified to give such testimony
and his own expert witnesses specifically contradict his statements.
The rule of Massie v. Firmstonehas been subject to modification. In Vaughana v. Eatoon, 197 Va. 459, 89 S.E. 2d 914
(1955), the court held that the plaintiff's testimony concerning the speed of a motor vehicle was merely an estimate by
the party and not binding. In a case involving an automobile
collision, the court stated that events occurring just prior to
a crash in which the party is injured are confused and distorted in his mind, and he may be unable to give an accurate
account of all that took place. Crew v. Nelson, 188 Va. 108,
49 S.E. 2d 326 (1948). Also see Burruss v. Suddith, 187 Va.
473, 47 S.E. 2d 546 (1948). In order for a party to be barred
from recovery, his statements must show beyond a reasonable doubt that he has no cause of action against his adversary. Edmonds v. Mecklenburg Electric Cooperative, 197 Va.
540, 90 S.E. 2d 188 (1955). See also Clayton v. Taylor, 193
Va. 555, 69 S.E. 2d 424 (1952) ;Waller v. Waller, 187 Va. 25,
46 S.E. 2d 42 (1948) ; Bircherds Dairyv. Randall, 180 Va. 311,
23 S.E. 2d 229 (1942); Kirkorian v. Daily, 171 Va. 16, 197
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S.E. 442 (1938); Tignor v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 166 Va. 284, 184 S.E. 234 (1936). For other jurisdictions
see Annot. 169 A.L.R. 798 (1944) and McCormick, Evidence
sec. 243 (1954).
In the recent case of Virginia Electric & Power Company
v. Mabin, 203 Va. 490, 125 S.E. 2d 145 (1962) the plaintiff,
while trying to repair a gutter, crawled under a wire which
had been negligently installed without insulation. The plaintiff crawled under the wire at a point where it was about
one foot above and behind him. The wire came in contact
with the plaintiff and threw him to the ground.
On direct examination, the plaintiff testified that he knew
of the wire and realized that if it were not insulated he would
be injured by it. He further stated that he did not know that
it was uninsulated nor that it carried high voltage electricity.
On cross examination, the plaintiff stated that he "must have
raised up a little bit for that wire to have hit me from the
distance I was from it .. ." but that he did not raise up into
the wire on purpose. He stated that he raised up only about
six inches.
The court reaffirmed the rule of Massie v. Firmstone, supra,
and stated on pages 493 and 494:
"... this rule must, of necessity, be subject to a qualification, so that a litigant with a meritorious claim or defense will
not be cast out of court because of some single, isolated statement which, when taken out of context . . . appears to be
conclusive against him.
"This qualification to the rule requires that a litigant's
testimony be read as -a whole. A damaging statement made
in one part of his testimony must be considered in the light
of an explanation of such statement made in a later part of
his testimony."
Consequently, a party's testimony must be read as a whole
allowing each individual statement to be modified or contradicted by the facts as collectively given. While this does allow
a certain latitude to the party testifying, it would seem justified by the protection afforded the deserving plaintiff from
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the skilled cross-examiner and from the party's own inability
to testify clearly to the actual facts.
LYN

B. OwEs

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Plaintiff's counsel may inform the jury of the amount prayed for by the plaintiff.
Phillips v. Fulghum, 203 Va. 543, 125 S.D. 2d 835 (1962).
The plaintiff was seriously injured when the automobile in
which she was a passenger was struck from the rear by an
automobile driven by the defendant. The plantiff brought an
action for personal injuries. Counsel for the plaintiff referred
to the ad damnum clause of the motion for judgment in both
his opening and closing arguments. The defendant's counsel
objected both times. Counsel based his objection on the fact
that the request for $35,000 in damages was not evidence in
the case and was without probative value. The court overruled
the objections.
On appeal the defendant relied heavily upon Simmons v.
Adams, 202 Va. 926, 121 S.E. 2d 379 (1961). In that case the
trial court instructed the jury that their verdict should not
exceed $15,000, the amount sued for. The Supreme Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case stating that an
instruction in this form was likely to be misleading and
prejudicial to the defendant. Chief Justice Eggleston in delivering the opinion in the principal case said:
We are invited to extend the holding in the Simmons
case and say that reference by counsel for the plaintiff to
the amount sued for by their client was likely to be misleading and prejudicial to the defendant and should not
have been permitted. We decline that invitation for two
reasons: In the first place reference to the amount sued
for by counsel for the plaintiff is not likely to have the
same effect upon the jury as reference thereto coming from
the court itself. In the next place, it would be illogical, if
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not absurd, to say that the jury should be instructed that
the amount of their award, if any, should not be in excess
of the amount sued for and then not told what that amount
is.
In refusing to extend the Simmons rule the court held that
counsel for the plaintiff could advise the jury of the amount
sued for. Counsel for the defendant may have the jury instructed that such amount mentioned is not evidence.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was confronted
with a split of authority in deciding the principal case. The
Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey hold that
counsel for the plaintiff cannot bring to the attention of the
jury the amount sued for. Porterv. Zeuger Milk Co., 136 Pa.
Super. 48, 7 A. 2d 77, 78 (1939) and Botta v. Bruner, 26 N.J.
82, 138 A. 2d 713, 60 A.L.R. 2d 1331 (1957). The court chose
to follow the contrary and majority view allowing counsel to
tell the jury the amount sued for. Williams v. Williams, 87
N.H. 430, 182 A. 172 (1935); Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298
Ky. 706, 183 S.W. 2d 637 (1944) ; Shockman v. Union Transfer
Co., 220 Minn. 334, 19 N.W. 2d 812 (1945); J. D. Wright and
Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W. 2d 786 (Tex. 1950);
Roussin v. Blood, 90 N.H. 391, 10 A. 2d 224 (1939); Freeman
v. ManhattanCab Corp., 150 N.Y.S. 2d 674 (1956); Jimmy's
Cab, Incorporatedv. Isennock, 225 Md. 1, 169 A. 2d 425 (1961).
Missouri, which has considered the problem extensively,
has shifted from the Pennsylvania view to the majority view.
The most recent cases hold that the plaintiff's counsel may
inform the jury of the ad damnum clause, but that it is
improper to allow counsel to state the amount for the first
time in his closing argument. Domijan v. Harp, 340 S.W. 2d
728 (Mo. 1960); Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W. 2d 661
(Mo. 1960). Note also: Bales v. Kansas City Public Service,
328 Mo. 171, 40 S.W. 2d 665 (1931); Shepard v. Harris, 329
S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1959); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 192 (1955).
For authority concerning counsel's argument stating a
per diem basis for calculating damages see Payne, Personal
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Injury Damage Arguments, University of Richmond Law
Notes 1:230, Spring 1961.

N. LEsaI SAuNDRRS, JR.
SALES: SUPPLIERS OF CHATTELS-Retailer who fails
to disclose true manufacturer and sells as his own product
assumes the manufacturer's liability for negligence in manufacture if vendee relies upon and reasonably believes the
vendor to be the manufacturer. The passage of time alone
does not confer immunity on a negligent manufacturer. It
merely is one factor to be considered in the question of liability. Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 309 F. 2d 300
(4th Cir., 1962).
The plaintiff purchased a six foot wooden stepladder from
Sears, Roebuck & Company and used it a few times a month
for about sixteen months. During the seventeenth month a
faulty rivet holding a cross brace which secured the two sides
together gave way, causing the ladder to collapse with the
plaintiff on it. The plaintiff suffered physical injury from
the fall and brought action for damages -against Sears, Roebuck & Company.
.The court found no breach of express warranty or of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, but it did
find that the vendee reasonably believed and relied upon the
vendor as the manufacturer, and it held that this reasonable
reliance imposed upon the vendor the liability of a manufaiturer. The court also found that the breach of duty
amounting to negligence was not nullified by the sixteen
months of occasional use.
The case follows established patterns in most respects, but
it seems to have contributed two significant elements to
the law of suppliers of chattels. It is, of course, well established that a manufacturer is liable to an injured ultimate
consumer for negligence in manufacture which is the proximate cause of the injury. This rule was laid down by Judge
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Cardoza in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and courts in the forty odd years
since then have made it well nigh universal. It is almost as
well established that a retailer who sells products known to
be made by another is not liable for negligence in manufacture
of which he is reasonably unaware. He is not required to open
sealed containers, take goods apart, or even conduct any
examination or inspection at all if it would normally be regarded as unnecessary. Kratz v. American Stores Co., 359
Pa. 335, 59 A. 2d 138 (1948); Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W. 2d 140 (1944) ; Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F. 2d 598 (9th Cir., 1941). But after
going down these well traveled paths the court blazes two
new trails in interpreting Virginia law.
The decision appears to establish the principle that a retailer will find himself liable to an uninformed purchaser who
reasonably relies upon his being the manufacturer when the
retailer chooses to advertise without disclosing the real manufacturer and when he uses in his advertising a trade name
with which he alone is identified. This principle has been
followed generally in other jurisdictions: Lill v. Murphy Door
Bed Co. of Chicago, 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E. 2d 714 (1937);
Blickman v. Chilton, Tex. Civ. App., 114 S.W. 2d 646 (1938);
Dow Drug Company v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E. 2d
130 (1936). See also Simmons v. Richardson Variety Stores,
1 Storey 80 (Del.), 137 A. 2d 747 (1957), where the lack of
holding out as a manufacturer by the retailer prevented the
customer's recovery. The retailer may believe this type of
advertising is most effective, but he will have to realize that
it carries with it a risk of liability not normally borne by a
retailer.
On the matter of liability after a period of use courts have
been prone to find no liability where it was shown that the
product had been in trouble-free use for a substantial period
of time. "The principle that the danger must be imminent
does not change, but the things subject to the principle do
change." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, supra, at
page 1053. However, Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Company of
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Chicago, supra,held that the lapse of time would not preclude
recovery since at the time the accident did occur it was the
result of the seller's negligence. The Sears decision, however, appears to say that the manufacturer who has negligently built an -admitted flaw into his product cannot escape
liability by showing an extended period of trouble-free use
alone. If it is found that the flaw is one which would naturally
work its way to the point of causing a failure after some
usage far short of the normal life expectancy of such a
product, then this finding is -also an element that must be
considered in determining liability.
AMTHUR S. MARIS

TAXATION-Payment received by an employee from his
employer as reimbursement for the loss sustained on the
sale of his home is taxable as additional compensation. Bradley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 T. 0. 64 (1963).
The petitioner was employed in Delaware. In April, 1957,
he accepted employment with a Richmond firm and offered
his Delaware home for sale. He moved to Richmond and commenced his duties on May 1, 1957 while his family remained
in Delaware until the home could be sold. The petitioner went
to Delaware on week-ends to see his family. His efforts to sell
the property were not immediately successful, and he was
concerned. Real estate appraisers ,had valued the property at
between $2.2,000 and $24,000.
Two months passed, and the project for which the petitioner had been hired as a key man was not proceeding as
well as the employer had expected. Therefore, in order to
relieve the petitioner's anxiety over his unsold residence, the
employer guaranteed that the petitioner would receive $23,500
on the sale of the Delaware property and promised to reimburse him for any loss resulting from sale at a lower figure.
The petitioner received but refused an offer of $19,000 for
the home. However, on March 18, 1958, after several months
of declining real estate prices, the petitioner sold the home
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for $18,500. On April 1, 1958, the employer made a payment
of $5,000 to the petitioner pursuant to its guarantee. The
assessment of income tax on this payment was contested by
the petitioner.
The petitioner contended that the amount received was
part of the amount realized from the sale and was not taxable
as additional compensation under Section 61(a)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The items which constitute
''gross income" under Section 61 (a) include:
"(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions and similar items;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property."
The petitioner argued that the payment clearly came within
Section 61(a) (3) and should accordingly be treated under the
provisions of Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 for determining gain or loss from the sale of property.
This conclusion was supported by Otto Sorg Schairer, 9
T.C. 549 (1947), where a similar reimbursement was considered. In Schairer the taxpayer had been an employee for
ten years. His employer directed him to move his residence
nearer to his place of employment. The employer agreed to
reimburse him for any loss resulting from the sale of his
former home. The taxpayer sold the residence and suffered
a loss for which he was duly reimbursed. The Tax Court
held that the amount received should be treated as part of
the amount realized on the sale of the residence rather than
as additional compensation.
The petitioner conceded that Scharer would not be applicable were the payment made as an inducement to accept
employment as in the case of Arthur J. Kobacker, 37 T.C. 882
(1962). The petitioner further conceded that it was easily
inferred that the payment was made as an inducement to
accept employment when the employee was a "new employee," but in the principal case the petitioner was not a
new employee since he had been employed for two months
when the guarantee was made. This conclusion is supported
by John E. Cavanagh, 36 T.C. 300 (1961), in which the Tax
Court held that an employee for five weeks was not a new
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employee. The petitioner maintained that Schairerwas therefore clearly controlling.
The petitioner further contended that, since the evidence
was clear that all of the arrangements for compensation had
been satisfactorily agreed upon before employment began, the
amount paid "was never intended as additional compensation" and could not be taxed as such.
In its opinion the court was frank in admitting that it could
not see any practical distinction between the principal case
and Schairer. However, the court felt that since 1947 when
Schairer was decided "the complexion of the law has materially changed on the subject of what is and what is not compensation."
The case which the court deemed decisive of the issue was
Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 76 S.Ct. 800 (1956).
In that case an employer under a stock option plan sold
stock to an employee at less than the fair market value. The
issue was whether the transaction constituted a gift or compensation. The Supreme Court held that the bargain sale
represented payments made as a direct inducement to greater
services and said, "When assets are transferred by an employer to an employee to secure better services they are
plainly compensation." The Tax Court failed to attach any
significance to the fact that Lo Bue turned on the gift versus
compensation question while in the principal case the issue
was compensation versus gain derived from the sale of
property with no argument being advanced by the petitioner
that the payment represented a gift.
The holding seems to stand for the proposition that a
payment in whatever form made pursuant to a guarantee
given by an employer to an employee, be 'he an old or a new
employee, if made as an inducement for better performance
on the part of the employee, is compensation and taxable
under Section 61(a) (1).

WnzmzA
R. KB

I. BANDAS
TF= W=Lpa
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TORTS-Federal Tort Claims Act excepts liability for negligent misrepresentation. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S.
696, 81 S. Ct. 1294 (1961).
The plaintiff brought an action against the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act as a purchaser of a home
on which a federally insured mortgage was issued. At the
request of the seller, an appraisal was made of the residential
property by an agent of the Federal Housing Administration.
The seller delivered to the buyer a written statement of the
value placed on the property by the FHA appraiser, and the
purchase price was established partly on the basis of this
appraisal. Shortly after the purchaser took possession of the
house, substantial cracks appeared in the interior walls and
ceilings in all of the rooms and in the cinder blocks in the
basement walls. It was then found by FHA officials that
cracks were appearing in the exterior walls, the one story sun
porch was separating from the east wall, and the foundation
was settling in an unusual manner. By drilling a hole through
the concrete floor of the basement, government inspectors
found that these conditions were caused by the character of
the subsoil which contained a type of clay that quickly disintegrated when exposed to water. It was determined that the
underpinning of the foundation would require the expenditure of several thousand dollars.
The U.S. District Court of Virginia at Alexandria entered
judgment for the purchaser in the sum of $8,000. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, 281 F. 2d 596 (1960), affirmed. The U.S.
Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting, reversed, holding that a provision in the Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
section 2680(h), excepting claims arising from misrepresentation or deceit applied to claims arising from negligent as well
as willful misrepresentation.
Subsection (h) of section 2680 contains ten additional torts
which are specifically excepted from those torts in which recovery is allowed against the federal government. It is interesting to note that all of these other actions are intentional
torts. The Supreme Court in United States v. Neustadt, supra,
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stated on page 1298 that this section ".... clearly meant to
exclude claims arising out of negligent, as well as deliberate,
misrepresentation." (emphasis added). In United States v.
Neustadt, 281 F. 2d 596 (4th Cir., 1960), the Circuit Court
made an attempt to distinguish a long line of cases supporting the proposition that liability of the government for a negligent misrepresentation was excepted by sec. 2680 (h). The
court attempted to show that in these facts there was negligent
performance of a duty which was not -within the exception
of the Tort Claims Act and relied on Otness v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. Alaska, 1959). These distinctions
were insufficient to compel affirmance by the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit
Court of Appeals on the basis of the uniform construction of
"misrepresentation" in see. 2680(h) to include negligence.
See Miller Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F. 2d 781 (2d
Cir., 1957); Anglo-American c& Overseas Corp. v. United
States, 144 F. Supp. 635, 242 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir., 1957); National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (8th Cir., 1954),
cert. denied, 74 S. Ct. 778; Jones v. United States, 207 F. 2d
563 (2d Cir., 1953), cert. denied, 74 S. Ct. 518, rehear.denied,
74 S. Ct. 627; Clark v. United States, 218 F. 2d 446 (9th Cir.,
1954); Steinmasel v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 335
(D.C.S.D., 1962); Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp.
581 (D.C. Cal., 1961); United States v. Van Meter, 149 F.
Supp. 493 (D.C. Cal., 1957).
The principal case points out the fact that the method of
specifically enumerating excepted torts rather than making
the distinction in terms of negligent and intentional torts
leaves something to be desired. A reading of the opinion of
the Circuit Court of Appeals presents a question 'as to the
fairness of this method and the results which it requires.
GERALD RuBINGER
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TORTS-Landowner or occupant liable only upon proof ol
gross negligence when defective condition on premises cause,
injury to licensee. Smith v. Allen, 297 F. 2d 235 (4th Cir.,
1961).
A licensee on the premises of a Virginia landowner waE
injured due to a defective condition existing thereon. ThE
federal court in reaching its decision determined that thE
rule of Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931), wa:
applicable. This Virginia case held that the driver of an automobile was responsible to his guest passenger only for grosE
negligence. The Virginia court in rendering its opinion in thE
Boggs case followed the leading case of Massalettiv. Fitzroy
228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917). This gross negligence rulE
was later codified by the Virginia legislature and is now Va
Code Ann. 1950 § 8-646.1 (Cum. Supp. 1962). Massachusett,
later extended the rule of the Massaletti decision and iT
Comeau v Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588, 92 A.L.R
1002 (1934), decided that a landowner is liable to his socia'
guest for gross negligence only. The federal court assumec
that the Virginia court would again follow the decisio,
handed down by the Massachusetts court. This view waE
taken despite the fact that one decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had expressly refused to exten
the gross negligence rule beyond cases involving motor ve.
hicles. Walthew v. Davis, Adm'r., 201 Va. 557, 111 S.E. 2c
784 (1960). The Virginia court in the Walthew opinion statec
on page 560 that the statute (§ 8-646.1) applies in its termE
to the operation of motor vehicles and the decision to extent
it to the operation of -aircraft is one to be made by thE
legislature.

The federal court quoted verbatim from the

RISTATzmBNT

§ 342 (1956) which sets forth the duty owed by a land
owner to -a licensee in regard to conditions existing on th
premises. Then the court, after deciding that the plaintii
was to be treated as a gratuitous licensee (licensee in Vir.
ginia), failed to apply the law which it had deemed ap
plicable. Certain statements by the court indicated that ifelt that there could be liability of the landowner to th
ToRTs,
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licensee under the Restatement section for defective conditions of which he should have known, but the Restatement
clearly requires that the landowner must have actual knowledge of the existing defect before any duty arises.
The federal decision stands for the proposition that a landowner is liable to a social guest for injuries resulting from
defective conditions on his premises only if he is guilty of
gross negligence. It also implies that a duty between the
landowner and the licensee arises when the landowner should
know of the defective condition on his land. While the federal court blazes its own trail, it would seem that the Virginia court will probably continue to follow the theories laid
down in Walthew v. Davis, Adm'r., supra, and the RESTATEMENT, TouTs, § 342 (1956).
STv.my
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